In this podcast I talk to Martin Weller, author of the Digital Scholar, about the changes which digital technology is bringing about within academia and where they might ultimately lead.
In this podcast I talk to Martin Weller, author of the Digital Scholar, about the changes which digital technology is bringing about within academia and where they might ultimately lead.

Do you value your ideas? If you’re reading this website then chances are you answered ‘yes’ to that question. Yet unless you record all your ideas I’d argue that you don’t value them. At least not as much as you could. It’s a difficult habit to acquire and it can be time-consuming. But technology is making it so much easier. If you have a smart phone, use twitter or blog then you have easy outlets for both recording your ideas and making them publicly available.
In the appendix to Sociological Imagination, entitled On Intellectual Craftsmanship, C. Wright Mills advocates keeping a file or journal within which to record your ideas. He argues that doing so:
encourages you to capture ‘fringe-thoughts’: various ideas which may be by-products of everyday life, snatches of conversation overheard on the street, or, for that matter, dreams. Once noted, these may lead to more systematic thinking, as well as lend intellectual relevance to more directed experience [...] by keeping an adequate file and thus developing self-reflective habits, you learn how to keep your inner world awake. Whenever you feel strongly about events or ideas you must try not to let them pass from your mind, but instead to formulate them for your files and in so doing draw out their implications, show yourself either how foolish these feelings or ideas are, or how they might be articulated into productive shape.
So why not start? Tools like Posterous or Tumblr can be great places for ‘online scrapbooks’ or ‘ideas gardens’. Though of course not all our ideas are good. But I take Wright-Mills to be saying that it’s only through recording our ideas in such a file that we become able to properly evaluate them and that, in doing so, we learn to keep ourselves intellectually alive.
In a recent book economist Don Thompson explores the crucial role that branding has in the contemporary art market. With the market skewed by the influx of the ultra-rich seeking something to do with their money, a strange dynamic emerges. As the author was told by a former specialist at Sotheby’s auction house, you should “never underestimate how insecure buys are about contemporary art, and how much they always need reassurance”. This widely recognised, though little discussed, characteristic of the contemporary art world massively expands the power of brand name auction house, galleries and collectors. The obscenely wealthy but time-poor rely on such brands to guarantee the virtues of the art they invest in, assuaging the insecurities about their purchases which are sustained because “they are not willing to spend the time required to educate themselves to the point of overcoming insecurity”.
For instance, as the author observes, “Larry Gagosian’s clients can simply substitute his judgement or that of his gallery for their own, and purchase whatever is being shown“. How different is this from the prestige conferred upon an academic publication by its inclusion within a well-respected journal? Simply denigrating the lack of taste shown by ultra-wealthy art collectors misses the point. Unless one wishes to descend into facile subjectivism (or conversely argue that his corporate operation indelibly corrupts his aesthetic judgements) it stands to reason that Gagosian’s judgements do function, as well as pretty much anyone’s could, as a cypher for distinction. It’s perfectly possible some complete crap occasionally finds its way into his galleries but, in terms of the unavoidably intersubjective normative standards which prevail at a given point in time (and which everyone must engage with even if they reject them) his judgements will tend to be distinguished ones. Similarly rigorous blind peer-review, conducted by a pool of top academics, within the traditions of a long-standing and well respected journals will tend to include distinguished papers. In both cases the additional competition which prestige generates, as many try to occupy a space which can only hold a few, entrenches this capacity to bestow distinction.
In both cases the task of filtering, sorting the range of cultural products in terms of their quality, takes place through bureaucratic processes. Particular institutions become able to invest cultural products with the feel of quality, a process which sits elusively between genuine normativity and contingent power, tending to succeeding in its aims but also shaping the wider social context within which such ‘success’ can be judged. Within the art world ”the dealer brand often becomes a substitute for, and certainly is a reinforcement of, aesthetic judgement“. Is it the case that within the academic world, inclusion in a prestigious journal becomes a substitute for, and certainly is a reinforcement of, intellectual judgement? As a thought-experiment: how would academic life differ if these status hierarchies weren’t available to help us navigate the knowledge system? How would we respond? I suspect that activities which are already everyday features of the academic – dialogue and debate within communities of practice – would take on a newfound importance. What else would be different? Answers on the back of a postcard please.
I just came across a fascinating passage from a lecture given by Carl Rogers, founder of person centered therapy, about the personal and intellectual biography which led him to his life’s work. In it he describes an experience as a graduate student at a seminary which had a profound impact on the direction of his life, as well as that of others:
Knowing universities and graduate schools as I do know – knowing their rules and their rigidities - I am truly astonished at one very significant experience at Union. A group of us felt that ideas were being fed to us, whereas we wished primarily to explore our own questions and doubts, and find out where they led. We petitioned the administration that we be allowed to setup a seminar for credit, a seminar with no instructor, where the curriculum would be composed of our own questions. The seminary was understandably perplexed by this, but they granted our petition! The only restriction was that in the interests of the institution a young instructor was to sit in on the seminar, but would take no part in it unless we wished him to be active.
I suppose it is unnecessary to add that this seminar was deeply satisfying and clarifying. I feel that it moved me a long way towards a philosophy of life which was my own. The majority of the members of that group, in thinking their way through the questions they had raised, thought themselves right out of religious work. I was one. I felt that questions as to the meaning of life, and the possibility of the constructive improvement of life for individuals, would probably always interest me, but I could not work in a field where I would be required to believe to believe in some specified religious doctrine. My beliefs had already changed tremendously, and might continue to change. It seemed to me that it would be a horrible thing to have to profess a set of beliefs, in order to remain in one’s profession. I wanted to find a field in which I could be sure my freedom of thought would not be limited.
Carl R. Rogers – On Becoming A Person: A therapist’s view of Psychotherapy – page 8
So, I wish to suggest, could this ever be a standard part of postgraduate education? Is it feasible to have such a seminar credited as part of a postgraduate qualification, given the need for modularity and standardised assessment in the present system of Higher Education? Even if it isn’t, should we be doing this anyway? Perhaps entry to the seminar could be conditional on high performance in more traditionally designed modules? I would have loved this as an MA student (and indeed still would in the final year of my PhD) and, thinking back on my masters experiences in two departments, I could imagine a number of academics – who clearly really enjoyed postgraduate teaching when, perhaps, they enjoyed undergraduate teaching less – also enjoying it and being incredibly effective hands-off facilitators.
I’m intrigued to see if others are as inspired by the passage above as I am – perhaps in part it’s because I’m fascinated by Rogers and only just found out about this aspect of his early history – so would appreciate any comments either on the blog or on Twitter. Likewise, does anyone have any ideas about how to make this happen? As I approach what will (hopefully) be my last two academics terms as a postgraduate student, I’m seriously considering approaching my department to see if there’s any way to arrange something like this for MA students and PhD students in the summer term. All input appreciated.
There was a time when I enjoyed e-mail. Before my PhD, e-mail had been largely peripheral to my life and something that was simply a back-up when other options weren’t available. Yet suddenly in my first year, it became ever more interesting. I’d log into my inbox and suddenly I’d find news about an event I wanted to go to, a part time job I could apply for or an interesting discussion on a mailing list I couldn’t help but read. There was so much interesting stuff in this new academic world that was opening up to me and e-mail felt like the conduit through which I could access it all.
How naive I was. A few years on, e-mail has become the bane of my existence, as I’ve become ever more familiar with the endlessly dispiriting Sisyphean cycle of finally clearing my inbox then, before you know it, suddenly finding it full again. Granted, I realise it was an incredible revolution in human communications but an abstract sociological appreciation of that fact doesn’t make it any less dispiriting when you yet again find yourself doing two hours of e-mail before bed just so you can start the next day with a vague feeling of self-organisation. In my brief working life in academia, e-mail has begun to seem like a self-perpetuating machine for constant distraction and over-commital. With this has come my introduction to the feeling of never quite being on top of everything which increasingly pervades academic life. In a 2009 article about the ‘hidden injuries’ of the modern university Rosalind Gil observes how:
In the extract that begins this section, the male professor characterises himself as variously ‘addicted’, ‘obsessive’ and ‘compulsive’ when he might more accurately be seen as enacting quite reasonable strategies in order to cope with an entirely unreasonable workload. ‘Addiction’ metaphors suffuse academics’ talk of their relationship to e-mail, even as they report such high levels of anxiety that they feel they have to check e-mail first thing in the morning and last thing at night, and in which time away (on sick leave, on holiday) generates fears of what might be lurking in the inbox when they return. Again, inventive ‘strategies’ abound for keeping such anxiety at bay eg putting on your ‘out of office’ reply when you are actually in the office.
Gill, R (2009) Breaking the silence: The hidden injuries of neo-liberal academia in Flood,R. & Gill,R. (Eds.) Secrecy and Silence in the Research Process: Feminist Reflections. London: Routledge
How common is this experience? I don’t know and, ironically, I realise I feel too pressured by the need to do e-mail tonight to properly research this question for a short article. Anecdotally though it seems pretty damn widespread. Yet within the contemporary university system, it is too easily framed as a marginal issue of personal productivity: ‘e-mail overload’ to be managed through ‘personal productivity’ strategies and coaching rather than an indicator of structural and infrastructural inadequacies within the university system. Academics are forced to seek biographical solutions to systemic contradictions. The fact universities offer support in better meeting those demands on an individual level is certainly welcome but it doesn’t exactly address the issue.
There’s a need for much greater pluralism and creativity within internal comms strategy. Without institutional support for diversification away from the present over-reliance on e-mail, it’s difficult to see how innovation can be sustained within higher education, given the demands placed on staff to do more with less in the current climate and the limitations of the communications infrastructure drawn upon at every stage of that activity. Paradoxically, it’s these ever-increasing occupational responsibilities which stand in the way of diversification away from e-mail on an individual level, as experimentation with other forms of internal communication is too easily dismissed as something one doesn’t have the time for.
Developing strategies to diversify away from e-mail should be a major strategic priority within higher-education. In order to avoid being yet another occupational pressures, these strategies must have a participatory focus, seeking to expand the repertoire of communicative styles and platforms available to academics in a way which is personally empowering. In doing so the institution would work towards maximising the latent capacity for creative communication and collaboration contained within it. By which I mean that, sociologically speaking, the communications infrastructure an institution relies on functions as both enablement and constraint in relation to the particular projects of the individuals within it (whose projects, in the broadest sense of the term, are very important to the institution because the individuals still enjoy a relatively high degree of occupational autonomy relative to much of the working world).
There’s only so much collaboration that can emerge if the communicative tools available are limited i.e. the latent capacity within the institution. Exactly how much of that capacity contingently gets exercised in a particular time and place is an empirical question but, in principle, everyone wins. Academics connect more seamlessly, autonomously and enjoyably with others. Institutions create the communicative conditions for a thriving, creative and interdisciplinary research culture. Exactly how this works in practice is a complex question. It’s also undoubtedly situational, at least somewhat defined by all manner of internal socio-cultural characteristics and histories of particular institutions. But as research questions go, it’s far from unsurmountable. It just needs time, resources and support at an institutional level.
A project like Wikipedia thrives because of it’s ability to harness the efforts of occasional contributors. As Clay Shirky suggests in his excellent Here Comes Everybody, the numbers willing to make a small contribution (e.g. proof reading an article and correcting typos) vastly outstrip the numbers willing (or able!) to sit and write an entire article from scratch. This dynamic allows collaborative production to spiral into an endless series of feedback loops, as a few who contribute a lot provide raw material which a far greater number who contribute a little subsequently ‘mop up’ (i.e. rephrase, extend, correct), in turn expanding the scope of the site and increasing both its actual traffic andpotential appeal, bringing ever more co-producers to Wikipedia. It’s an incredibly powerful iterative process, as can be seen in the statistics describing the site’s growth:
In fact the sophistication which characterises the discussion at the above link (how best to model Wikipedia’s growth) is testament to the intellectual power of iterative co-production. So the obvious question is: how can this dynamic be harnessed by social science 2.0?
One of the obvious problems which Wikipedia raises, particularly within academia, is that of expertise. How can the intellectual outputs of an anonymous and collaborative endeavour be trusted? After all, academic life is predicated on systems of accreditation which have been evolving for centuries. The simple answer is that it’s not warranted to uncriticallytrust any particular article on Wikipedia because mistakes and inaccuracies pervade the system. Expertise is an emergent characteristic of the overarching site but not one (at least not a taken-for-granted on) of any one article.
If this was a commercial encyclopedia then this inadequacy would be something of a deal-breaker. People wouldn’t pay money for a series of books that they couldn’t trust and, conversely, the manufacturer wouldn’t produce a series of books which people would be unlikely to pay for. However what makes Wikipedia unique is a generic property of the web (massively reduced production costs) and a specific property of the site itself (open-ended self-correction). These add up to one very special property: minimal cost of failure. The point at which aggregative failure threatens the integrity & utility of the overarching system is far lower than any comparable pre-internet endeavour.
As a system Wikipedia can survive a great deal of failure and, in turn, this facilitates iterative self-correction. Because there’s no central agency which has invested money in the project in the hope of making a profit, there’s no incentive to cut their losses because the project ceases to be commercially viable. This lack of a cut off point means that iterative co-production can continue and, through doing so, actually correct the failures which might otherwise have led to its demise. In the process new failures will occur but these too can be corrected.
I find Wikipedia absolutely fascinating when seen in cybernetic terms. There are three properties I’ve discussed which need to be considered when articulating a concept of Social Science 2.0: